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Abstract
With the maturing of deep learning systems, trustworthiness
is becoming increasingly important for model assessment.
We understand trustworthiness as the combination of ex-
plainability and robustness. Generative classifiers (GCs)
are a promising class of models that are said to naturally
accomplish these qualities. However, this has mostly been
demonstrated on simple datasets such as MNIST, SVHN and
CIFAR in the past. In this work, we firstly develop an ar-
chitecture and training scheme that allows for GCs to be
trained on the ImageNet classification task, a more relevant
level of complexity for practical computer vision. The re-
sulting models use an invertible neural network architec-
ture and achieve a competetive ImageNet top-1 accuracy
of up to 76.2%. Secondly, we show the large potential of
GCs for trustworthiness. Explainability and some aspects
of robustness are vastly improved compared to standard
feed-forward models, even when the GCs are just applied
naively. While not all trustworthiness problems are solved
completely, we argue from our observations that GCs are
an extremely promising basis for further algorithms and
modifications, as have been developed in the past for feed-
forward models to increase their trustworthiness. We re-
lease our trained model for download in the hope that it
serves as a starting point for various other generative clas-
sification tasks in much the same way as pretrained ResNet
models do for discriminative classification.
Code: github.com/VLL-HD/trustworthy GCs
1. Introduction
Generative classifiers (GCs) and discriminative classi-
fiers (DCs) represent two contrasting ways of solving classi-
fication tasks. In short, while standard DCs model the class
probability given an input directly, p(class | image) (e.g.
softmax classification), generative classifiers (GCs) take the
opposite approach: They model the likelihood of the input
Normal input OoD input
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Figure 1: Example for one of the advantages of generative
classifiers: The class posterior of a DC always sums to 1.
The image likelihoods of the GC do not have this restric-
tion.From this, the GC can show whether a prediction is un-
certain because the input agrees with both classes, or with
neither. For the DC, there is no difference between these
two cases. The small numbers in the bars are exemplary
output probabilities.
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image, conditioned on each class, p(image | class). The
actual classification is then performed by finding the class
under which the image has the highest likelihood. To clar-
ify the terminology: the main use of a GC is not to generate
some new images (although this is certainly possible, by
sampling from the learned distribution); DCs and GCs both
get an image as input, and output probabilities. The differ-
ence is in whether these are posterior class probabilities, or
probability densities of images conditioned on each class.
Because of the increased complexity of the task, the ap-
plication of GCs has been limited to very simple datasets
such as MNIST, SVHN and CIFAR-10/100 in the past. For
any practical or real-world computer vision applications,
DCs are used exclusively, due to their excellent discrim-
inative performance. In principle however, GCs are said
to have various advantages over DCs, which align with the
term trustworthiness. In general agreement with [26], we
understand trustworthiness mainly as the combination of
explainability and robustness.
Explainability Deep neural network based DCs are no-
torious for being ‘black boxes’, prompting many develop-
ments in the field of explainable AI. In the taxonomy laid
out in [19], most commonly used algorithms fall into cate-
gories I or II, meaning they attempt to visualize how the net-
work processes information, or its internal representations,
in a post-hoc manner. In this case, the explanation obtained
can vary depending on the method used or the hyperparam-
eters, and there is no guarantee that the results truly reflect
what the DC is doing internally. In contrast, GCs bring to
mind Feynman’s mantra “What I cannot create, I do not un-
derstand”. As GCs are able to model the input data itself,
not just the class posteriors, they have fundamentally more
informative outputs. For instance, GCs allow us to tell if a
decision between two classes is uncertain because the input
agrees well with both classes, or with neither (see Fig. 1). In
addition, most types of GCs have interpretable latent spaces
with meaningful features. Through this, the actual decision
process can be directly visualized, without relying on post-
hoc techniques. The latent space brings other advantages
too, such as analyzing inter- and intra-class relationships
(Fig. 19). In these ways, GCs could be argued to belong to
category III of the explainability taxonomy [19], i.e. meth-
ods that intrinsically work in an explainable way, without
additional algorithms.
Robustness A second large concern about practical use
of deep learning systems is their robustness, which can have
different meanings, depending on the context and area of
research. In particular, GCs have been assumed to be supe-
rior to DCs in terms of generalization under dataset shifts
[41] and accurately calibrated uncertainties [3]. The latter
is especially critical, DCs often make highly confident pre-
dictions, even when the input is completely unrelated to the
training data [23, 47, 12]. A secondary aspect of robustness
is the explicit detection of abnormal or out-of-distribution
(OoD) inputs. Returning to the example from Fig. 1, we
can imagine it is easy for GCs to explicitly detect the sec-
ond OoD case by using a threshold on the predicted proba-
bility. The user or system can then be notified that the input
is OoD, and the decision should not be trusted. Lastly, in
the context of adversarial attacks, robustness is commonly
understood as the difficulty of finding a successful attack.
For a more ‘robust’ model in this sense, the adversarial per-
turbations will be larger, and in the best case the attack will
fail entirely. GCs were found to be more robust towards
adversarial attacks than DCs [34], and attacks can also be
explicitly detected.
While all these advantages are well-known and have
been observed for simple datasets, it has so far remained
unclear whether they also apply for more complex tasks,
and whether GCs can be used in this case. For example,
the authors of [16] find while GCs correctly assign lower
likelihoods on adversarially perturbed images in the case
of MNIST, they do not for the more complex CIFAR-10
dataset. The authors of [35] observe that OoD detection us-
ing generative likelihood models fails in various ways when
applied to natural images. In [17], the authors cast doubt on
whether GCs can be used for high-dimensional input data
at all. To further investigate potential issues arising from
dataset complexity, and properly demonstrate the potential
of GCs for computer vision, we train a GC on the ImageNet
dataset. We choose this dataset specifically for three rea-
sons: Firstly, it remains a moderately challenging task, even
for modern deep neural networks, and is therefore a useful
benchmark for our purposes. Secondly, the data is easily
understandable by humans, making it suitable for demon-
strating explainability techniques. Lastly, due to the diverse
nature of the dataset, networks pre-trained on ImageNet are
usually used as the starting point for solving other practical
tasks; pre-trained ResNets or VGG networks are ubiquitous
in current deep learning research. The first step in adopting
GCs for practical applications should therefore be the same:
Providing pre-trained models suitable for a wide variety of
complex tasks to enable building more explainable, robust
and therefore more trustworthy computer vision systems.
To summarize, this work shows that GCs can perform
at a level relevant to practical applications. We find that
naively applied GCs do not solve all aspects of trustworthi-
ness ipso facto, but that they offer significant improvements
and a more advantageous starting point compared to feed
forward models in the goal of fully trustworthy computer
vision. Our contributions are the following:
• We show the technical changes necessary to reach
competitive classification performance using a GC for
ImageNet. Our model achieves up to 76.2% top-1
accuracy. A similar standard ResNet model achieves
77.4% [22].
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• We demonstrate various techniques for explainability
that are unique to GCs. Without any additional algo-
rithms, it is possible to natively visualize decision pro-
cesses, class relationships, and properties of OoD data.
• We examine different aspects of the robustness of the
GC model. While measurably more robust to adver-
sarial attacks, we cannot extend the claims that GCs
are virtually immune to them [18, 43]; nor do we find
significantly better generalization under various image
corruptions. On the other hand, both cases can be ex-
plicitly detected fairly reliably by utilizing OoD tests
only applicable to generative models.
2. Related Work
Years before the deep learning revolution, works such as
[38, 52, 41] already compared the properties of GCs vs DCs,
theoretically and experimentally. While the question of task
performance varies across works, most agree that GCs are
more robust and more explainable. Works like [6, 5, 55]
presented models that combine the aspects of GCs and DCs,
to reach a more favourable trade-off compared to each ex-
treme. However, all these works consider comparatively
simple problems, suited to the models of the time. Later,
with the unmatched task performance that deep-learning
based DCs delivered in the 2010s, GCs became rarely used.
As one example of more recent work, [17] investigates
normalizing-flow based GCs trained on natural images. The
authors find that naively trained conditional likelihood mod-
els achieve very poor classification performance, and argue
that this is due to some model properties that are not prop-
erly penalized by maximum likelihood training. Later, [3]
propose that this problem can be avoided by training with
the Information Bottleneck loss function instead. The au-
thors of [33] modify the problem, and train a GC on features
previously extracted by standard feed-forward network. For
all these works, the most complex dataset used is CIFAR-
100, at a resolution of 32× 32 pixels.
So-called hybrid models [40] have been more success-
ful in practice. Here, a likelihood estimation method is in-
volved, commonly for the marginal p(image), while the ac-
tual classification is still performed in a discriminative way,
using shared features between the two tasks. Notable exam-
ples are [31, 15, 11, 36, 21]. While these models can per-
form OoD detection, their main motivation has been semi-
supervised learning. Hybrid models have some fundamen-
tal differences to GCs, e.g. that the conditional likelihoods
are not directly modeled, and the latent space has no explicit
class structure.
Concerning OoD detection with generative models, the
authors of [35] observed that likelihood models trained on
natural images are unsuitable for detecting certain types of
OoD inputs, and may perform significantly worse than ran-
dom. This problem is addressed e.g. in [37, 10], where
different OoD metrics are introduced that correct for these
shortcomings. These works only consider unconditional
likelihood models for OoD detection, while a separate clas-
sifier is still needed to perform the actual task. This means
it is harder for the class content to factor in to both OoD
detection and explainability techniques. GCs combine both
these steps into a single model, potentially simplifying the
process.
Adversarial attacks viewed as OoD data, specifically
in relation to GCs, have also been addressed recently
[43, 18, 34]. All three works use variational models as GCs
which are shown to be more robust against adversarial at-
tacks and able to detect them. While these works highlight
the potential of GCs, they are limited to simple datasets,
such as MNIST and SVHN. We want to investigate whether
this observed behaviour extends to more complex tasks.
3. Methods
3.1. Invertible Neural Networks
While VAEs have been used as generative classifiers with
some success [43, 18, 34], perhaps the most natural choice
are normalizing flows, due to their exact likelihood esti-
mation capabilities [14]. The networks used in normaliz-
ing flows are so-called invertible neural networks (INNs), a
class of neural network architectures that meet the following
conditions: (i) the network represents a diffeomorphism by
construction (essentially, a smooth and invertible function),
(ii) the inversion is computationally efficient to compute,
and (iii) the network has a tractable Jacobian determinant.
These conditions place some restrictions on the architec-
ture, e.g. that the number of input and output dimensions
have to be equal, and that non-invertible operations such as
max-pooling can not be used. In recent years, various differ-
ent invertible architectures have been developed that fulfill
these conditions [13, 14, 4, 20]. In this work, we employ the
affine coupling block architecture proposed in [14], with ad-
ditional modifications, as described in Appendix A. When
such coupling block INNs are trained in the same way as
standard feed-forward networks, they only have a small dis-
advantage in terms of quantitative performance compared to
standard architectures, despite the design limitations [29].
As mentioned above, the most popular application of
INNs, that has driven much of the research in the past, are
so-called normalizing flows. In any generative setting, there
are training images X , that follow some unknown image
distribution p(X). The goal is then to approximate p(X)
as closely as possible with a distribution given by the net-
work, which we denote as qθ(X). In the case of normalizing
flows, qθ(X) is represented by transforming possible inputs
X to a latent space Z using an INN fθ (‘flow’), with a pre-
scribed standard normal latent distribution p(Z) = N (0, 1)
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(‘normalizing’). Then, the change-of-variables formula can
be used to compute qθ(X) at any point x through
qθ(x) = p
(
Z=fθ(x)
)
|det J(x)| (1)
with J ≡ ∂fθ/∂X being the Jacobian. It can be shown that
the network will learn the true distribution (qθ(X) = p(X))
by maximizing the expected log-likelihood log qθ(X), as
given through Eq. 1 above [48]. After training is com-
plete, the model can not only be used to estimate likelihoods
qθ(X), but also to generate new samples by inverting the
network, in order to map sampled instances of Z back to
image space.
Class Conditioning In our case, this approach is not suf-
ficient, as we want to use the INN as a generative clas-
sifier, meaning we need to model conditional likelihoods
qθ(X | Y ). While different approaches for this exist [53, 2],
we adopt the form introduced in [27]. Here, the latent distri-
bution is a conditional density p(Z | Y ): The standard nor-
mal distribution p(Z) is replaced with a Gaussian Mixture
Model (GMM) containing a unit-variance mixture compo-
nent per class
p(Z |Y ) = N (Z;µY ,1) (2)
p(Z) =
∑
y
p(y) p(Z | y) =
∑
y
p(y)N (Z;µy,1) (3)
where µy is the mean of class y; and the mixture weights
are the class priors p(y), i.e. the frequency of occurrence
of each class in the dataset. The conditional likelihood
qθ(X|Y ) can be evaluated with the change-of-variables for-
mula (Eq. 1) as before by replacing the full distribution
p(Z) with the appropriate mixture component:
qθ(X |Y ) = p
(
Z=fθ(X)
∣∣∣Y ) |det J | . (4)
3.2. Training INNs with Information Bottleneck
Naively training such an INN with a class-conditional log-
likelihood loss will generally not work, as the resulting
models perform very poorly [17], even on only mildly chal-
lenging tasks. Instead, we require a loss function where the
focus on the generative and class-separating capabilities can
be explicitly adjusted and controlled. For this, we utilize the
IB objective [50], which describes the ideal loss function for
robust classification, from an information theoretical point
of view. Given some features Z of a network, inputs X ,
and ground-truth task outputs Y , the IB loss consists of two
terms using the mutual information I (MI):
LIB = I(X,Z)− βˆI(Y,Z). (5)
Intuitively, the MI measures the degree of shared infor-
mation between variables, and can be written as the KL-
divergence between the joint and factored distributions of
the variables:
I(V,W ) = DKL
(
p(V,W )
∥∥∥p(V )p(W )), (6)
By minimizing the IB loss, the amount of information
about the desired output Y contained in the features I(Y,Z)
is being maximized. Simultaneously, the amount of infor-
mation about the original input image contained in the fea-
tures I(X,Z) is minimized, which results in robust and effi-
cient representationsZ. The loss as a whole therefore yields
a model which is as robust as possible while working at a
given level of task performance. Furthermore, this trade-off
can be explicitly adjusted by choosing βˆ.
How to apply this objective to INNs as GCs is not im-
mediately obvious, as INNs preserve information, and the
loss becomes ill-defined. The authors of [3] show that this
can be avoided by adding very low noise to the inputs. This
is mostly a formal requirement, as dequantization noise is
used as a data augmentation for standard normalizing flows
regardless. From this, the authors go on to derive two loss
terms representing the IB objective, LIB = LX + βLY . In
practice, for our model, the two terms amount to the follow-
ing, noting that z = f(x):
LX(x) =− log |det J(x)|
+
1
2
logsumexp
y′
(
‖f(x)−µy′‖2 − 2wy′
)
(7)
LY (x, y) =onehot(y)
· log softmax
y′
(
1
2
‖f(x)−µy′‖2 − wy′
)
(8)
Hereby, y′ denotes the summation over all classes in the
logsumexp and log softmax operations. The relative log-
class weights wy := log p(y) are usually learned, but for
ImageNet we assume a constantwy = log(1/(# classes)) =
log(1/1000), making all classes equally likely. The differ-
ence between βˆ in the original IB and β in the loss is a con-
stant weighting factor, that makes both loss terms the same
size at β ≈ 1. More details can be found in [3].
Intuitively, we find the following: The LX -loss forces
the data to follow the GMM in latent space. However, it
has no effect on the class-conditional aspect, as the class y
is summed out; note that the ground truth class is not used
in the loss at all. This loss can be rearranged to look sim-
ilar to the maximum-likelihood-loss used for normalizing
flows, but with a GMM as a latent distribution. On the
other hand, the LY -loss bears resemblance to the categor-
ical cross entropy loss, except that the usual logits are re-
placed by log p(z|y)p(y) = log p(z, y). Therefore, LY is
responsible to make the likelihood model conditional on the
class, but otherwise ignores the generative performance.
The trade-off parameter β determines how much the
model focuses on capturing the class structure at high β
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(important for classification performance, LY ), vs. model-
ing natural images at low β (important for generative perfor-
mance, robustness, LX ). In the limit cases, at β → 0 we get
a model which best models the training data distribution but
ignores the class content. It will be maximally ‘robust’ in
a sense, by always making useless random predictions. At
β →∞, we have a model that can predict the class content
of the input data, but we expect no generative capabilities,
and the least robustness. We find that the trade-off is more
nuanced in reality, as shown later in Sec. 4.1.
3.3. Detecting OoD Inputs
For likelihood-based generative models, OoD inputs are
easily detected by directly utilizing the estimated probabil-
ity density qθ: in principle, if an input is outside the support
of the training data, and the model has learned the true dis-
tribution, the OoD sample should be assigned log qθ(x) =
−∞. In practice, it is only required that OoD samples have
lower likelihood scores than the training data, so a threshold
can be set. Any input with a inferred likelihood below this
threshold is then treated as OoD (see Fig. 2, top). How-
ever, in [35], the authors identified various special cases
where OoD inputs have an unnaturally high log-likelihood
score. This prompted the developement of a typicality test
in [37], that uses both an upper and a lower threshold, cen-
tered symmetrically around the mean log-likelihood of the
training data (Fig. 2, middle). For our ImageNet models, we
observe that the distribution of log-likelihood values in the
training set is highly asymmetrical. Therefore, we introduce
a third possibility, a two-tailed quantile test. Instead of the
thresholds being symmetric around the mean, they are cho-
sen so that an equal mass of the log-likelihood histogram
lies above the upper and below the lower threshold (Fig. 2,
middle). In practice, we only measure minor differences in
performance between the single-sample typicality test and
the two-tailed quantile test.
All three tests can also be seen as hypothesis tests, with
the null hypothesis being that the input is in-distribution.
The p-value for the hypothesis test is the fraction of train-
ing samples with scores in the OoD-zone, which also equals
the false positive rate. To evaluate the OoD detection capa-
bilities, we do not use a single threshold value, but want a
measure that is independent of it. This is because the ac-
ceptable false negative/false positive trade-off depends on
the context/application that the model is used in. By vary-
ing the p-value of the test, we produce a receiver operat-
ing characteristic (ROC) curve. The area under this curve
(ROC-AUC), in percent, serves as a scalar measurement of
the OoD detection capabilities. An ROC-AUC of 100%
means that the OoD samples are perfectly separated from
the in-distribution samples and can always be identified cor-
rectly. A value of 50% indicates that the test performs ex-
actly as well as randomly deciding. Below 50%, worse than
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Figure 2: Illustration of three different OoD tests based on
the estimated likelihood. The curve shows the distribution
of likelihood scores in the training set. The blue part counts
as in-distribution, and the red part as OoD. The threshold is
chosen such that the red area (false positive rate, p-value), is
0.1 in all three cases, for illustration. In practice, this would
be chosen much lower, e.g. 0.001. The small red numbers
indicate the fraction of training samples above and below
each threshold.
random performance, the OoD data appears to be more in-
distribution as a significant fraction of the training data it-
self.
4. Experiments
4.1. Network Architecture
A detailed description of the network architecture is
found in Appendix A, we summarize the main points in the
following.
We construct the invertible network (INN) from affine
coupling blocks, as introduced in [14], with various modifi-
cations from other recent works [1, 2, 28, 30]. As invertible
alternatives to 2× 2 max-pooling and global mean-pooling,
we use a Haar wavelet transform [2] and a DCT transform
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Layer Blocks Im. size Channels R.F.
INN ResNet INN ResNet
Input 224 3 3
Entry flow 1 112 12 64 8 6
Pool (Haar/max) 56 48 64 10 10
Conv 2 x 3 56 48 256 34 34
Conv 3 x 4 28 192 512 106 90
Conv 4 x 6 14 768 1024 314 266
Conv 5 x 3 7 3072 2048 538 426
Pool (DCT/avg.) 1 150 528 2048 ∞ ∞
Table 1: For each of the resolution levels in the INN and
ResNet-50, the number of coupling/residual blocks and spa-
tial size is given, along with the number of feature channels
and the maximum possible receptive field (R.F.).
ResNet INN
Network parameters (M) 23.5 55.4
All parameters (M) 25.6 77.5
FLOPs (G) 4.07 9.08
Table 2: Number of parameters and computational cost
for each model. ‘Network parameters’ only counts the
coupling/residual blocks. ‘All parameters’ additionally in-
cludes the fully connected output layer of the ResNet, and
the parametrization of µy for the INN. The (M) and (G)
indicates Mega and Giga respectively. For FLOPs, the
fused multiply-add instruction (FMA) is counted as a sin-
gle FLOP, as it is commonly a single instruction in modern
computing architectures.
[28] respectively.
Because of the similarities between affine coupling
blocks and residual blocks used in a ResNet, we match the
design of the INN to that of a standard ResNet-50 wher-
ever possible. The overall layout is summarized in Table 1,
c.f. [22], Table 1. Some differences arise due to the con-
straint of invertibility: the number of feature channels and
the available receptive field vary between the two networks.
The invertibility is associated with an extra cost of pa-
rameters and computation cost. Table 2 summarizes this in
comparison to a standard ResNet-50. Both in terms of net-
work parameters, as well FLOPs needed for one forward
pass of the network, the cost of the INN is about twice as
high as the ResNet. We are optimistic this overhead can be
reduced in the future with more efficient INN architectures.
4.2. General Performance
Losses and task performance. We train several gener-
ative classifiers, with values of the hyperparameter β ∈
{1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32,∞}, while all other hyperparameters stay
constant. To reiterate: β controls how much the model fo-
cuses on the generative likelihood estimation aspect (low
β), vs. prioritizing good classification performance (high
β L(test)X (↓) L(test)Y (↓) Bits/dim. (↓) Acc. (%) (↑)
1 −1.90 8.52 4.34 67.30
2 −0.65 8.26 6.14 71.73
4 1.14 8.14 8.72 73.69
8 3.66 8.10 12.35 74.59
16 7.17 8.06 17.43 75.54
32 10.81 8.01 22.68 76.18
∞ 27.68 7.99 47.01 76.27
0 −3.11 – 2.59 –
ResNet – 7.87 – 77.40
Table 3: Test losses and metrics for models trained with dif-
ferent β. Bits per dimension is the most commonly used
metric to evaluate the performance of density estimation
models, see text. As with the original ResNet, the accuracy
is computed using 10-crop testing.
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Figure 3: Trade of between the two lossesLX andLY (top),
and between generative modeling accuracy in bits/dim, and
top-1 accuracy (bottom). Each point represents one model,
trained with a different beta. A standard ResNet has no LX
loss, and is shown as a horizontal line, and the model with
β = 0 (standard normalizing flow) is missing the LY loss,
and is shown as a vertical line. The small white numbers in-
side the markers give the value of β of that particular model.
β). We use these models throughout the experiments, to
examine the differences between GCs and DCs in a con-
tinuous way. In addition, we include a model trained with
β = 0, i.e. no classification at all, analogous to a stan-
dard normalizing flow, as well as a standard feed-forward
ResNet-50 [22].
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The primary performance metrics used in Table 3 and
Fig. 3 are firstly, the top-1 accuracy on the test set (in our
case, the ILSVCR 2012 validation set [42]), using 10-crop
testing. In detail, the image is resized so the shortest edge
is 256 pixels, and then cropped to a square. Next, five
224×224-pixel patches are cropped from the corners and
center, as well as their horizontally flipped versions, giving
10 crops in total. Finally, each of these 10 crops is passed
through the network, and the logits are averaged before the
final softmax operation. This is the method used most of-
ten for this setting, so we adhere to this standard. For a
generative classifier, as there are no logits per se, the logit
averaging is analogous to taking the geometric mean over
the 10 input crops for both the denominator and enumerator
of Bayes rule.
Secondly, for the generative likelihood estimation per-
formance, we use the bits per dimension (‘bits/dim’) metric,
as this is the prevalent evaluation metric for such models. It
quantitatively measures the accuracy of the likelihood esti-
mation. Originating in models that estimate the density on
discrete inputs (e.g. 255 brightness levels per RGB channel
per pixel [39]), bits/dim measures how many bits would be
needed on average to store the value of each input dimen-
sion, if an ideal encoding were formulated using the models
estimated likelihoods. If the quality of the likelihoods is
worse, the encoding will be less efficient w.r.t. to the real
data, and more bits will be needed to store the inputs. This
can be generalized for continuous density models such as
standard normalizing flows, explained e.g. in [49]. Impor-
tantly, it can be shown that bits/dim is exactly proportional
to the KL-divergence between the true and estimated densi-
ties:
bits/dim ∝ DKL(p(X) ‖ qθ(X)) + const. (9)
However, the constant offset is fundamentally unknown and
data dependent, so while bits/dim is a strong quantitative
metric to compare different models against each other, it
cannot indicate how good the model is on an absolute level.
In Table 3, we report the test losses and the two dis-
cussed performance metrics for the different models. Fur-
ther shown in Fig. 3, changing β moves smoothly between
the limit cases of a feed-forward network, and a pure den-
sity estimation model: the classification accuracy increases
continuously with β, but a minor gap remains to the feed-
forward ResNet-50, in line with works such as [29]. At the
same time, the bits/dim grows continually worse compared
to the purely generative model (β = 0).
Receptive field. While the maximum possible receptive
field (RF) of the INN and a standard trained ResNet are
roughly comparable (see Table 1), we see large differences
in the effective RF. For the effective RF, we pick a feature
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Figure 4: Effective receptive field for each value of β, just
before the final pooling operation. Note the logarithmic sen-
sitivity axis.
space column u, before the DCT pooling operation. Mean-
ing, from the H ×W × 3072 feature space, u will be the
1× 1× 3072 column. We choose a column from the center
to avoid interactions with the edges. We call the individual
features ul (l = 1 . . . 3072). We now measure the gradient
w.r.t. each channel of each image pixel xijk, for real input
images. The pixel position is ij, and the color channel is k.
We define the ‘sensitivity’ of the model at each position as
the L1 norm of the gradient of the features w.r.t. that input
position, averaged over images from the test set:
Sensitivity(i, j) = Ex∈test
[
3∑
k=1
3072∑
l=1
∣∣∣∣ ∂ulxijk
∣∣∣∣
]
(10)
There are other definitions that would be equally sensible
(squared gradients, frobenius norm, etc.), but the results al-
ways show the same behaviour.
The cross-sectional shape of this represents the effective
RF, and is shown in Fig. 4. We observe that for low β, the
effective RF is very narrow. In fact it is almost as narrow as
it could possibly be: for β ≤ 4, the FWHM of the sensitivity
is only 64 pixels. This is the same we would get from only
the downsampling steps, without any spatial convolutions
(with 6 downsamplings, 26 = 64). This could indicate that
for the likelihood estimation, local details and structures are
more important than any long-range features. For higher
values of β, the response more closely matches that of a
standard trained ResNet (1.25 times wider in line with the
1.25 times larger maximum possible RF).
Calibration The calibration of a model measures the
truthfulness of the predictive posteriors. In short, if we con-
sider predictions where the model is e.g. 80% confident in a
class, we would expect the prediction to be correct 80% of
the time. If it were correct more often, it would be under-
confident, and vice versa, more commonly, if it were correct
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β RN
1.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 16.0 32.0 ∞
ECE (%) 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17
MCE (%) 5.54 3.13 5.47 4.57 5.50 5.28 5.10 7.72
OCE 3.87 4.13 4.31 4.73 4.15 4.94 5.12 6.75
Table 4: Calibration Errors for different values for β and
for the ResNet. Expected Calibration Error (ECE), Max
Calibration Error (MCE), Overconfidence Calibration Error
(OCE)
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Figure 5: Calibration curves for the model with β = 1, and
a standard ResNet-50, for reference. Deviations below di-
agonal = overconfidence, above = underconfidence. The er-
ror bars are the Poisson errors computed from the bin count.
in much fewer than 80% of cases, it would be overconfi-
dent. Plotting the fraction of correct predictions R over the
binned confidence C of predictions gives the so-called cal-
ibration curve R(C). For a perfectly calibrated model, the
curve will follow the diagonal, but usually the behaviour
deviates.
To quantitatively measure the deviations, we compute
the expected- (ECE), the max- (MCE) and the overconfi-
dence calibration error (OCE). More details on the compu-
tation of these measures can be found e.g. in Appendix D of
[3]. The ECE measures the expected distance from the di-
agonal, weighted by the bin count n(C) at any confidence:
ECE =
1
ntot
∑
C
n(C)|C −R(C)| (11)
But for tasks with more than ∼ 10 classes, the ECE is al-
most completely dominated by the ‘negative’ predictions:
for any ImageNet prediction, typically only a few classes
have a meaningful confidence, while e.g. 990 of the 1000
classes will have confidences < 0.1%. So the lower end
of the curve is weighted ∼ 100 times stronger than the rest
of the curve, severely shifting the ECE statistic towards the
very low confidence regime. The MCE measures the maxi-
mum distance from the diagonal:
MCE = max
C
|C −R(C)| (12)
The MCE is not affected by the same phenomenon as the
ECE, but in return is subject to random fluctuations of
sparsely populated regions on the curve; it only takes a sin-
gle bin into account. Finally, the OCE measures the normal-
ized fraction of wrong predictions that are highly confident
with C ≥ Ccrit, where we use Ccrit = 99.7%.
OCE =
1
1− Ccrit
∑
C≥Ccrit
|1−R(C)| (13)
For instance, an OCE of 3.5 would mean that in these high-
confidence cases, the model is wrong 3.5 times more often
than allowed, the error rate should be≤ 1−Ccrit = 0.3% in
these cases. This measures more directly the cases we may
be interested in: we want to be able to trust the decisions if
they are very confident. The OCE is less noisy than MCE
in our case, as it takes more samples into account.
We report the result in Table 4. The full calibration
curves for all considered classifiers can be found in Ap-
pendix Fig. 20. In short, we confirm previous observations
e.g. in [3]: the GC models are better calibrated than DCs.
The OCE shows the clearest trend of increasing overconfi-
dence with β. Even from the β =∞ model to the standard
ResNet, there is a significant jump in the calibration error,
also seen clearly in the full calibration curves. As the loss
function for training at β = ∞ is essentially the same as a
standard ResNet, this must be due to the construction of the
model. Explained further in 4.3.2, our conjecture is that it
is due to the latent space structure specifically.
4.3. Explainability
We do not perform an exhaustive analysis and compar-
ison of all possible explainability techniques, this far ex-
ceeds the scope of a single paper. Furthermore, the quality
of an explanation is highly subjective, and also depends on
the context the model is used in. In the following, we sim-
ply demonstrate several examples how GCs can be used for
native and intuitive explanations of the data and the pre-
diction outputs. Certainly, algorithms and approaches exist
that can generate similar results for DCs. The point made by
the following examples is simply that various explanations
are accessible using only the structure of latent space and
the learned likelihoods, without requiring many additional
modifications or heuristics.
4.3.1 Visualizing decision-space
The properties of a classification decision can in principle
be easily seen, by passing an input image though the net-
work, and observing its position in latent space in relation
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Figure 6: Latent space location of input images (black point) in the decision space spanned by the µy of the top 5 predicted
classes. The horzizontal axis of the plot is the axis connecting the the top 2 predicted classes (red and blue points). The
vertical axis of the plot shows the radial distance from the horizontal axis in the 5D space. The illustrative circles are chosen
such that in both the vertical and horizontal directions, 90% of the mass of the Gaussian mixture component lies inside.
Note that the axes in the plot are scaled differently to make it appear as a circle. From left to right: Confident in-distribution
decision, uncertain in-distribution decision due to ambiguous classes, uncertain decision with unambiguous classes, uncertain
out-of-distribution decision.
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Figure 7: Latent space of a model with only ten classes,
where the µy (black points) are constrained to a plane. The
black lines are the decision boundaries, e.g. all points inside
the ‘moped’-polygon will be classified as a moped. The
background is colored according to the probability density
of each mixture component.
to the surrounding classes. The only difficulty consists in
plotting the high-dimensional vectors in a 2D figure.
One possibility how this can be done is shown in Fig. 6.
First, for the latent vector of a given input, the five clos-
est class centers µy are found. By construction, this will
also be the top 5 predicted classes. The latent vector is then
projected to the subspace spanned by these classes. The
decision process is almost entirely determined by what hap-
pens in this subspace, as the remaining 995 classes typically
make up< 1% of the total predicted probability. From here,
the horizontal axis of the 2D plot is the line connecting the
top two classes, and the vertical simply gives the radial dis-
tance to the other three classes orthogonal to this connect-
ing line. Examples for several different inputs are shown in
Fig. 6.
A second method is shown in Fig. 7. Hereby, the task is
simplified to allow for a 2D visualization: A subset of 10
ImageNet classes is selected. Starting from the full model,
the µy of the selected classes are constrained to a plane and
fine tuned, reaching 90% accuracy for this simplified 10-
class case. This allows us to show the entire decision space
in a single 2D plot. The decision boundaries between all
classes form a Voronoi tessellation of the decision space.
All latent vectors inside the Voronoi cell of a certain class
will have the highest probability under that class. In the
case where the µy are not constrained to a plane and all
1000 classes are used, the behaviour is the same, with high-
dimensional polygons for each class, but this can not be
readily visualized.
4.3.2 Class similarities
Building on the previous example, we see that different
classes have various amounts of overlap. We can examine
this more closely, as it pertains to the relative relationships
between classes. This is not possible for a feed-forward
model, as there is no latent space where the input data is
embedded in such a way. We observe that the locations
µy of the Gaussian mixture components are close together
for classes that are semantically similar, and far apart for
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Figure 8: Similarity matrix between all 1000 classes. The
two large clusters around class index 250 and 750 are dogs.
The colormap indicates the pairwise distance of the µy as
well as the expected pairwise posterior, meaning e.g. the
binary decision between a tabby cat and a tiger cat is asso-
ciated with 20% expected uncertainty, by construction (see
text).
classes that are dissimilar.
Importantly, this also has implications for the predictions
the model makes. For instance, in Fig. 6, 2nd from left, the
classes overlap a lot. This means more points will lie in the
overlap zone, and consequently more of these decisions will
be uncertain, compared to e.g. the 3rd from the left, where
most inputs will be in only one of two classes. More pre-
cisely, the closer two class centers are, the larger the overlap
is, and the larger the proportion of decisions between these
two classes that will be uncertain. In fact, for two classes A
and B, if A is the top prediction, the expected posterior for
class B can be worked out explicitly from the distance be-
tween the µA and µB in latent space, see Appendix B. We
do this pairwise for all 1000 classes, with the results seen in
Fig. 8.
These considerations highlight an important fact: the la-
tent mixture model contains a built-in uncertainty between
classes. A decision between similar classes will always be
uncertain, by the structure of latent space alone, not fully
reliant on the actual model outputs. This may be one of
the factors explaining why the predictive uncertainties are
overall better calibrated in such GCs [3].
4.3.3 Heatmaps and saliency-maps
To increase the trust in a decision, it is often helpful to
show which regions of the image were relevant. Examples
are widespread where models e.g. base the decision on the
background of the image, not the object in question, or fo-
cus only on a specific detail that identifies an object. Ap-
proaches such as CAM or GradCAM [56, 44] are used to
generate coarse heatmaps showing regions that are influen-
tial for a particular decision. For the INN-based generative
classifier, we can replicate such heatmaps. Interestingly,
they can be written as a direct decomposition of the pre-
diction output, so the heatmaps can be more understood as
simply a different way of representing the actual model out-
put, rather than a post-hoc explanation technique.
To produce a spatially structured output, we consider
the following: Due to the invertibility of every part of the
model, we can start from the output z, and transform it back
through the DCT operation. Unlike standard mean-pooling,
the DCT pooling does not lose any information in either di-
rection. We define the following for short:
w(y) = DCT−1(z)−DCT−1(µy)
= DCT−1
(
z − µy
)
. (14)
Because the DCT operation is linear and orthogonal, it con-
serves distances, and we can write
p(z|y) ∝ exp
(
−1
2
‖z − µy‖2
)
= exp
(
−1
2
‖w(y)‖2
)
(15)
We can consider the spatial structure present in w(y): It will
have three indices, k, l for the spatial position and m for the
feature channels: w(y)klm. We can simply factorize over the
spatial dimensions. For the log-probability, we get
log p(z|y) =
∑
k,l
−1
2
‖w(y)kl,:‖2 + const. (16)
:=
∑
log p(wkl|y) (17)
We can now consider the class prediction:
qθ(y|x) = p(z|y)∑
y′ p(z|y′)
=:
p(z|z)
S(z)
, (18)
where p(y) = 1/M and the Jacobian |det J | both cancel
out. We therefore plot for any class the following ‘class
posterior heatmap’:
QClass(k, l, y) = log p(wkl|y)− Skl s.t.
∑
kl
Skl = S
(19)
The −Skl term means a fixed ‘image’ is subtracted from
each heatmap, representing the denominator, which is con-
stant for all classes. There is some freedom to choose Skl,
as long as it sums to S. When distributing it evenly over
space, the differences in the heatmaps between classes are
hard to see by eye, compared to the common differences
within the heatmaps shared across classes, which are larger
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Figure 9: Magnified regions of the simliarlity matrix in Fig. 8, using the same colormap. The distance on the diagonal is 0
(outside colormap range).
by magnitude. Heuristically, we instead find the best con-
trast when we choose the relative weight of each Skl in the
following way:
Skl = S
rkl + 0.03∑
kl(rkl + 0.03)
(20)
where rkl is the same as log p(wkl) but normalized to the
[0, 1]-range over each image. Some examples are shown in
Fig. 10.
Comparing to Eq. 18, we see that summing QClass
over feature-space pixels gives exactly the log-prediction
log qθ(y|x). So QClass represents a spatial decomposition
of the actual predictive output:
qθ(y|x) = exp
(∑
kl
QClass(k, l, y)
)
(21)
4.4. Measuring Robustness
In current literature, there is no agreement upon a single
measurement that clearly defines robustness in deep learn-
ing. In general, the question is how a model reacts to out-of-
distribution (OoD) inputs, meaning inputs that do not come
from the same distribution as the training data. OoD data
can be further categorized, among others: Images from a
slightly different (‘shifted’) data distribution, e.g. synthetic
training and real test images; images which were once in-
distribution, but which are corrupted in some way; images
that are semantically unrelated to the training data and/or
show specific objects that have never been observed before;
and images that are maliciously altered to trick the model,
so-called adversarial attacks. In the following, we briefly
discuss four different measurements that can all be under-
stood to quantify robustness.
In the case that the OoD data semantically contains the
same information as the training data, especially for dataset
True: bow tie
(93.8%)
Qclass(bow tie)
(4.1%)
Qclass(suit)
(1.1%)
Qclass(sunglass)
True: limpkin
(33.1%)
Qclass(limpkin)
(23.3%)
Qclass(vulture)
(2.7%)
Qclass(bald eagle)
True: Rottweiler
(92.1%)
Qclass(Rottweiler)
(3.5%)
Qclass(Appenzeller)
(0.9%)
Qclass(soccer ball)
Figure 10: Examples of the prediction heatmaps. Top:
bowtie and sunglasses are located, suit is distributed over
a large area. Middle: The head of the bird causes it to be
classified as a limpkin, whereas the feathers are more in-
dicative of an eagle of vulture. Bottom: The heatmaps of
both Rottweiler and Appenzeller classes are located in the
same area (ambiguous classes), while the soccer ball is sep-
arate.
shifts, the most straight forward understanding of robust-
ness is that the model retains good performance for these
OoD inputs. Measuring this is easy, it simply means mea-
suring the task performance on OoD data and comparing to
the performance on in-distribution test data. But there are
other cases where this definition is not applicable or realis-
tic: There is no ‘correct’ prediction if the OoD input does
not contain one of the classes that was trained for, or if the
image is completely corrupted and semantically unrecog-
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nizable.
A second idea of robustness is therefore, that the model
should at least make uncertain predictions for OoD inputs.
In reality, standard (non-robust) models make highly over-
confident predictions on OoD data [45]. The most direct
measure of this is the discrete entropy of the predictive out-
puts, as discussed in [45].
Thirdly, a robust model can be one that is able to explic-
itly detect OoD inputs. In this case, along with the usual
task output, the model has some auxiliary output that in-
dicates whether an input is OoD. The model is robust by
explicitly indicating that it’s prediction may not be trusted
in these cases. GCs are uniquely suited for this, as the
estimated likelihood of the inputs can serve as a built-in
OoD detection mechanism, but other approaches also ex-
ist [32, 25, 9]. To measure this, metrics such as the area
under the receiver-operator curve can be used (AUC-ROC).
Finally, in the context of adversarial attacks, robustness
is commonly understood to be the amplitude of adver-
sarial perturbation necessary to trick the model [54]. If
the adversarial perturbation is large enough, it is visible to
humans and also easier to detect. This can measured e.g.
through the L2 distance between the original and the at-
tacked image.
4.5. Handling Corrupted Images
We first consider the robustness test established by [24].
Here, the existing ImageNet validation images are corrupted
with 5 severity levels in 15 different ways, summarized in
the categories: noise, blur, weather, and digital. The au-
thors propose the mean corruption error (mCE) and the rel-
ative mean corruption error (rel. mCE) score to measure the
robustness of a classifier. The mCE measures the error of
some model f , weighted and then aggregated over all cor-
ruptions. The weight is computed based on the achieved
error of the AlexNet classifier on the different corruptions
as different corruptions pose different levels of difficulty.
The measure is computed as follows
mCEf =
1
15
15∑
c=1
∑5
s=1E
f
s,c∑5
s=1E
AlexNet
s,c
, (22)
withEfs,c denoting the classification error of model f , given
the corruption type c with the severity s. EAlexNets,c stands for
the error achieved by AlexNet and is used as a weight of
difficulty for a particular corruption c with severity s.
The relative mean corruption error instead measures the
performance degradation of a classifier f relative to it’s per-
formance on uncorrupted data. It is computed as follows
Rel. mCEf =
1
15
15∑
c=1
∑5
s=1E
f
s,c − Efclean∑5
s=1E
AlexNet
s,c − EAlexNetclean
(23)
with Efclean and E
AlexNet
clean standing for the errors achieved on
the uncorrupted ImageNet validation set for classification
model f and the AlexNet classifier respectively.
Again, we report all results obtained by our models and
the ResNet. As can be seen in Table 5 our GCs do not show
an increased robustness to the applied corruptions in terms
of mCE. However, the GCs do infer less confident predic-
tions on the corrupted images, compared to the DCs, seen
from the predictive entropy. Furthermore, we are able to
classify these images as outliers. Generally, we observe
better OoD detection scores for smaller values for β. The
Snow, Frost and Brightness corruptions remain hard to de-
tect. We find the GC trained with β = 2 to be the most
robust classification model: It is able to detect a wide range
of corruption types while being a reasonably good classi-
fier (4.54 percentage point classification performance gap
compared to the β = ∞ model and 5.67 percentage point
gap compared to ResNet). To summarize: The GC models
are not more robust to synthetically applied corruptions in
terms of task error. Some types of corruptions can be accu-
rately detected, while others are not detected at all.
4.6. Handling Adversarial Attacks
We are interested in finding out if generative classifiers
are more robust to adversarial attacks when using high di-
mensional data such as ImageNet. We are not proposing a
new, competitive method of adversarial attack defense, the
goal is simply to examine whether GCs are naturally more
robust to adversarial attacks on ImageNet, in the same way
it was observed for e.g. MNIST previously [34, 43].
For evaluation, we performed a well established white-
box targeted attack method introduced by [8]. Here, the
attacked image is parametrized as xatt = 12 (tanh(w) + 1),
to ensure the image values are between 0 and 1. The at-
tack then consists of optimizing w directly to minimize the
following objective:
LCW(w, x) = ‖xatt(w)− x‖2
+ cmax
(
max({ly : y 6= t})− lt,−κ
)
(24)
The original image is x, and the logits output by the model
for each class y are ly . The target class, that the attacked
image is supposed to be classified as, is t. The logits are re-
computed by the model on each iteration using the updated
xatt(w), which they depend on: ly = ly(xatt(w)). The
gradients are propagated through the model.
In other words, the attack objective simultaneously at-
tempts to make xatt and x the same, and to maximize the
difference between the logit of the target class, and the cur-
rently next highest predicted class. Once the distance is
larger than the hyperparameter κ in favour of the target
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Noise Blur Weather Digital
β Clean Error mCE rel. mCE ∆ entrop. OoD Gauss. Shot Impulse Defocus Glass Motion Zoom Snow Frost Fog Bright Contrast Elastic Pixel JPEG
0 – – – – 77.51 94.9 94.3 98.0 95.7 89.8 88.3 89.5 38.1 43.1 94.8 44.7 96.7 65.5 63.0 66.2
1 32.7 98.5 116 1.62 67.9 95.3 95.2 98.6 92.9 87.1 84.9 87.4 33.0 45.4 96.5 43.5 97.0 60.4 61.9 55.6
2 28.27 92.5 119 1.75 73.6 94.8 95.2 98.5 87.8 82.6 81.3 84.9 30.9 43.2 96.5 44.1 95.2 56.6 61.0 51.2
4 26.31 88.2 117 1.72 70.84 92.7 93.8 97.4 77.6 76.7 75.6 81.7 31.0 43.2 95.5 44.5 89.2 54.1 61.7 48.0
8 25.41 86.8 117 1.81 65.85 89.3 91.2 94.6 56.9 63.5 63.1 73.7 37.6 46.6 87.8 45.1 71.2 53.1 65.1 49.1
16 24.46 84.9 115 1.79 62.43 83.7 84.6 88.0 46.7 56.7 63.5 67.9 43.2 52.0 80.2 45.6 66.3 53.3 62.0 42.7
32 23.82 83.1 113 1.71 55.83 81.6 81.5 84.0 39.8 51.6 50.1 54.8 43.9 44.3 61.6 44.6 53.9 52.4 52.5 41.1
∞ 23.73 83.4 114 1.58 44.24 39.5 44.5 40.6 42.8 48.1 46.3 46.0 40.9 38.9 36.1 44.3 48.5 52.2 47.9 47.0
ResNet 22.6 78.2 109 1.51 – –
Table 5: We report the error obtained on the unperturbed images (clean error), the mean corruption error (mCE), the relative
mean corruption error (relative performance degradation caused by the corruptions), the average difference in predictive
uncertainty between corrupted and clean images (∆ entrop.), and the OoD ROC-AUC detection score (OoD) averaged over
all types of perturbations as well as for the individual corruptions. Meaning of colors: good detection≥ 85%; some detection
> 55%; random or worse detection ≤ 55%.
−3 −2 −1 0 1
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0 Confidene not reached
Confidence satisfied
Original Attacked Diff.
Figure 11: Trajectory of four adversarial attacks on the 10-class model from Fig. 7 shown in latent space (colored curves),
with κ = 1, d = 0. In the dotted section of the curves, the classifier is not yet fooled with sufficiently high confidence.
In the solid section, the classifier has been fooled, and the attack only tries to reduce the perturbation. The large black dot
indicates the position of µtarget (the position with highest probability density for this class), the target class being ‘Harvestman
(spider)’. The solid black lines are the decision boundaries to the surrounding classes. The dashed black lines are the
boundaries of the region where the classifier is fooled with sufficiently high confidence corresponding to κ. On the right, the
four attacked images are shown, along with the resulting perturbation. More examples given in Appendix C.
class, this loss term does not contribute anymore. Adjust-
ing κ therefore has a direct influence on the confidence of
the (wrong) predictive posterior. From an attackers point
of view it is optimal to fool a classifier to make certain but
wrong predictions by setting a high value for κ, while find-
ing a w so that xatt is as close as possible to the original
image x. Ideally the differences between xatt and x remain
imperceptible to the human eye. From the victim networks
point of view, the targeted wrong prediction should be as
uncertain as possible, and the difference between xatt and
x as large as possible.
For GCs, there are not logits per se. Istead, we use the
conditional log-likelihoods ly = log p(x|y), to get the same
behaviour. We performed all adversarial attacks on the same
randomly chosen 200 test images, paired with the fixed ran-
dom target class each. To perform the attack, we use the
Adam optimizer with its initial learning rate set to 0.01, as
in [8]. We performed the attacks with three different values
for κ: 0.01, 1.0, ∞. The parameter c was fixed and set to
10, which is the lowest possible value for achieving a 100%
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Figure 12: Qualitative results demonstrating the influence
of κ (controlling the classifiers final confidence on targeted
classes) and β (controlling the generative modeling capa-
bility of the classifier) on adversarial attack robustness. The
discriminative classifier ResNet is added for reference. The
figure, showing the per-pixel errors in RGB space, gives
the absolute difference between the original (bottom right
corner) and the adversarially perturbed image, amplified by
a scaling factor for visibility. For adversarial attacks to
achieve highly confident posteriors (high value for κ) the
noise has to be amplified. In order to successfully trick a
classifier with better generative modeling capabilities (low
value for beta) the noise added by the attack has to be even
larger.
attack success rate on all our tested models. We assume
the attack converged whenever LCW stops improving for
20 consecutive gradient steps.
Explainable Adversarial Attacks In Fig. 11, we perform
an attack on the model from Fig. 7. The trajectory of the at-
tack in decision space can thus be visualized. We find that
the attack consists of two distinct stages. First, the attack
attempts to cross into the area belonging to the target class,
leaving a certain margin specified implicitly by κ. Second,
the attack minimizes the magnitude of the adversarial per-
turbation, while staying inside this region (sometimes step-
ping outside the region for a single iteration). More exam-
ples are given in Appendix C, Fig. 21. For the full model
with 1000 classes, we see the same behaviour, although the
decision boundaries can no longer be visualized (see Ap-
pendix C, Fig. 22). For the 2D figure, we consciously chose
a target class located at the ‘edge’ of the latent space, not
circled by other classes on all sides. This is because for the
1000 class case in higher dimensions, all classes are essen-
tially guaranteed to be such ‘edge’ classes.
An important lesson to take from this, is that the area of
maximal confidence of the attack is not necessarily closest
to µtarget. Instead, the confidence depends on the difference
of the squared distance to the other classes (see Eq. 24). Es-
pecially for high κ, sufficient confidence is only achieved
far outside of the original distribution. This facilitates reli-
able detection in these cases, see quantitative results below.
Quantitative Results All results concerning adversarial
attacks are summarized in Fig. 13. We observe the GCs
to be measurably more robust, in terms of necessary ad-
versarial perturbation, growing with smaller β. The gap to
the ResNet (roughly factor 2) is consistent to what was ob-
served for a simplified version of CIFAR10 in [34, Fig. 7].
We would expect the trend to continue for β < 1, for the ad-
versarial pertubations to be even larger, but at that point the
task performance may not be satisfactory anymore. In terms
of κ, the adversarial pertubations increase a lot for κ = ∞
(confident fooled predictions), but the increase is homoge-
neous across models including the ResNet. We show this
qualitatively in Fig. 12. Furthermore, as can be seen in Fig-
ure 29 in the appendix, optimizing for highest possible con-
fidence results in adversarial noise that is clearly visible to
the human eye. For κ = 0.01 and κ = 1 on the other hand,
the applied noise is a lot harder to perceive by humans (See
Fig. 23 and Fig. 26). We make a second important observa-
tion: For most models, the predictive confidence is similar
to the ResNet. However, β = 1 and β = 2 are 100% con-
fident in their (wrong) prediction, even for low values of κ.
During the attack, this occurs while the fooling part of the
loss is already satisfied and has no effect. The phenomenon
is purely due to the attack reducing the amplitude of the per-
turbation. Evidently, by reducing the attack amplitude, the
image moves into an even more confident region of latent
space. So in the sense of predictive uncertainty on adver-
sarial examples, GCs actually seem to be much less robust
than DCs.
Adversarial Attack Detection We now frame the adver-
sarial attack detection as an outlier detection problem and
perform the OoD test described in Sec. 3.3.
The easiest case to detect is clearly κ = ∞, where most
GC models achieve a perfect ROC-AUC of 100%. For
κ = 1 and κ = 0.01, the situation is more challenging.
With respect to beta, we find a bi-modal shape of the de-
tection score: β = 1 pefroms best, with an ROC-AUC of
> 90%. β = 32 also perform fairly well, with a large de-
crease in between these two values. For datasets such as
MNIST and SVHN, results are inconsistent and reported in
different ways [43, 34, 18], but roughly speaking, the de-
tection capability for β = 1 seems slightly worse or similar
for ImageNet in comparison. Again, β could be reduced
further, and we would expect an even better detection score.
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Figure 13: Behaviour of GCs under adversarial attacks. The three rows of plots give the mean pertubation, detection score,
and uncertainty of the wrong prediciton (1− confidence). The three columns of plots correspond to adversarial attacks with
κ = 0.01 (targeted prediction with any confidence is enough), κ = 1 (targeted prediciton should have high confidence),
and κ = ∞ (targeted prediction should be as confindent as possible). The three bars for each β correspond to: standard
adversarial attack (d = 0), as well as d = 66 and d = 1000, i.e. the detection mechanism is fooled at the same time as the
prediction. The dotted line in the top row roughly indicates the level at which attacks are clearly visible by eye. Note that this
is subjective and only a rough indication. The line in the second row indicates random performance, i.e. the OoD detection
does nothing useful.
Attacking the Attack Detection Mechanism As illus-
trated previously in [7], any such defense- or detection
mechanism can itself become target of a modified attack,
fooling the classification and the detection at the same time.
In line with this work, we construct a modified attack loss to
achieve this. We denote it as LCWD(w, x) (D for detection)
in Eq. 25. In the added term, median(log(qθ(xtrain)))
stands for the median estimated probability density (PD) of
the training set and log(qθ(xatt)) for the estimated PD of
the perturbed image. Intuitively, we are now forcing xatt to
move to the center of the distribution of PD values of the
training data. If it reaches the median exactly, the ROC-
AUC detection score will be 0%. In addition to d = 0 in
Fig. 13 and Tables 7, 8, 9, we report results for a moderate
(d = 66) and a very strong detection attack (d = 1000).
LCWD(w, x) = LCW(w, x)
+ d
(
median
x′∼Xtrain
(
log qθ(x
′)
)− log qθ(xatt(w)))2
(25)
We make three observations: the adversarial noise is
increased, when putting a higher focus on fooling the at-
tack detection mechanism. This can also be clearly seen
in Fig. 14 and in the quantitative comparison in Fig. 13,
first row. Second, in the second row of Fig. 13, we observe
the attack detection capabilities generally to decrease. For
the good detection models such as β = 1, the score stays
reasonably high, while the weaker models have a detection
score significantly worse than random. Lastly, the predic-
tive uncertainty is not affected by the detection attack at all
(Fig. 13, third row).
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Figure 14: Qualitative results demonstrating the influence
of d (controlling the strength put on fooling the attack de-
tection mechanism) and β on adversarial attack robustness
for κ fixed to 1. The more weight is put on fooling the attack
detection mechanism (higher values for d), the more noise
must be added to the input image by the adversarial attack.
In order to fool the generally stronger detection mechanism
of classifiers with higher generative modeling capabilities,
the noise must be even higher.
Inspecting the attacked images also provides some clues
as to how the attack fools the detection mechanism: They
show uniformly decreased contrast. As shown in [35], such
low-constrast images have unnaturally high estimated like-
lihoods. In our case, this seems to compensate for the lower
estimated likelihood caused by the noise-like adversarial
pertubations, to make the image appear ‘typical’ overall.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we have addressed the issue of trustwor-
thiness in deep learning, in relation to generative classifiers
(GCs). While many properties linked with trustworthiness
are often ascribed to GCs, such as increased robustness and
explainability, we feel it has so far not been shown clearly
enough that these properties actually apply for tasks that
are representative of real-world applications. In this regard,
we have shown the methods used to train GCs on the Ima-
geNet dataset, as well as the advantages and the limitation
of using them compared to a standard discriminative clas-
sifier, the ResNet. Of course, the naive application of GCs
does not solve all problems related to trustworthiness au-
tomatically. However, there are some significant improve-
ments over standard DCs, espeicially in terms of explain-
ability and native out-of-distribution detection capabilities.
From this, we conclude that GCs are a promising basis for
trustworthy computer vision models, if further modificia-
tions and algorithms are developed, as have been for DCs
in the past. We contribute the checkpoints for several GCs
trained on ImageNet to the community in the hope that they
will serve as a starting point for solving even more com-
plex computer vision problems through GCs, and will help
in designing more trustworthy classification models in the
future.
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– Appendix –
A. Network Architecture Details
In the following, we outline the design choices and train-
ing procedure used for training the INN model as a GC on
the ImageNet dataset. It has been noted in the past that
there are strong parallels between ResNet residual blocks
[22] and INN affine coupling blocks [14], described further
below. In fact, under some additional constraints, standard
ResNet residual blocks can also be numerically inverted [4].
Therefore, a standard ResNet is not only the most fitting
comparison to our GC, but also informs many of our de-
sign choices. The argument is, that ResNets contain many
carefully tested design choices, leading to their excellent
discriminative performance. Adopting these choices where
possible saves us from performing an infeasible number of
ablations and comparisons ourselves, and still achieve rela-
tively good performance empirically.
Affine coupling operation. As a basic building block of
our network, we use the affine coupling block shown in
Fig. 15. Such blocks were fist introduced in [14], and are
exactly and cheaply invertible, as well as having a tractable
Jacobian determinant. The incoming features are first split
in two halves, say u1 and u2, along the channel dimen-
sion. The first half u1 is not changed, and passed straight
through. A subnetwork, similar to the residual subnetwork
of a ResNet then predicts affine coefficients s, t from u1,
which are used to perform an affine transformation on the
other half of the features u2. This gives us outputs v1, v2:
v2 = s(u1) u2 + t(u1) and v1 = u1 (26)
To invert this operation given only v1, v2, note that u1 = v1
is trivially available, so the same coefficients s, t can be
re-computed for the inverse. With these, the affine trans-
formation itself can be analytically inverted, to get back
u2 = (v2−t(v1))s(v1). To guarantee invertibility, we re-
strict s(·) > 0. In theory, s(·) 6= 0 suffices, but this compli-
cates the situation and does not improve expressive power:
mirroring an output dimension is irrelevant for the network
and the loss. We ensure s(·) > 0 by using exp(α tanh(·))
activation on the s-outputs of the subnetwork, as previously
in [14], where α is a fixed hyperparameter. In principle, exp
alone would be enough, but this leads to instabilities dur-
ing training, as it can become infinitely large. Importantly
to note, the subnetwork itself never has to be inverted, and
is always computed forward. Therefore, it can contain the
usual operations such as convolutions or batch normaliza-
tion.
To compare, in a standard ResNet block, a copy oper-
ation is used instead of the split, and a simple addition is
performed in place of the affine transformation. Apart from
this, the structure is very similar.
Complete coupling blocks. The expressive power of the
affine coupling above is insufficient: half the data is not
touched at all, and the remaining varibles can only be scaled
up/down by a factor of at most exp(±α). We add two more
invertible operations to solve these problems: We first per-
form a global channel-wise affine transformation to all vari-
ables with scaling sglobal and bias tglobal. This technique was
already proposed in [14] and refined in [30] as ‘ActNorm’.
Note that in feed-forward networks, this is also often done
as part of the batch normalization layers. Again, sglobal
must be positive, and we achieve the best results choosing
sglobal = s0softplus(γ) = s0 log(1+e
γ). Here, γ and tglobal
are learned directly as free parameters, and s0 is a scalar hy-
perparameter which we fix to 0.1, while γ is initialized to
10.
Secondly, we want to use a different split in the next
block, and therefore have to apply some invertible opera-
tion that mixes the channels. So far, there is no ‘default’ ap-
proach to this in the INN literature. Various methods exist,
such as simply swapping the two halves [13], learned house-
holder reflections [51], fixed permutations [1], and learning
unconstrained mixing matrices [30], among others. While
it is desirable to use a learned mixing operations, we do
not find any benefits in practice. The method used for [30]
has no guaranteed invertibility, and the training can simply
crash when the matrix becomes singular. The householder
matrices from [51] quickly become computationally expen-
sive with many reflections, and in our case bring no em-
pirical benefit over fixed (not learned) mixing. Instead, we
use a random orthogonal matrix from the O(N) Haar dis-
tribution after each coupling block, that stays fixed during
training. This encourages more mixing than a simple hard
permutation, and empirically gives the best results with our
architecture.
With an orthogonal mixing matrix, the overall log-
Jacobian-determinant of one coupling block can be shown
to be
log
∣∣ det(J)∣∣ = ∑ log s(u1) +∑ log sglobal. (27)
Due to the chain rule, and product decomposition of the
determinant, the sum of the log-Jac-det of each coupling
block will give the log-Jac-det of the entire network. An
illustration of a coupling block is given in Fig. 15, left.
Subnetworks. We adopt the ResNet design choices for
building the affine subnetworks, with one modification: we
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Split channels
Concatentate channels
Global affine
Soft permute
Block input 48
Block output 48
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subnet
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24+24
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Batch norm. + ReLU
1× 1 Conv. 24→ 64
Batch norm. + ReLU
3× 3 Conv. 64→ 64
Batch norm. + ReLU
1× 1 Conv. 64→ 256
Batch norm. + ReLU
1× 1 Conv. 256→ 24 + 24
Coupling subnet
Figure 15: Illustration of the coupling blocks used, as well
as the structure of the subnetworks used to predict the affine
components. The purple numbers indicate the number of
feature channels, given as an example for the fist resolution
level (see Table 1, Conv 2 x).
add an additional 1x1 projection layer as the final output.
This is motivated by the fact that the INN has less feature
maps than the ResNet for all but the last resolution level.
Therefore, the expressive power would be limited by only
having this few output channels for the final convolution.
The subnetwork design is shown in Fig. 15, right.
Downsampling blocks. In the past, various invertible
downsampling operations have been used, e.g. [14, 29, 2].
Notably, none of these have a learnable component, such
as strided convolutions. Instead, we introduce a downsam-
pling coupling block, as a natural extension of the down-
sampling residual blocks present at the end of each ResNet
section. Shown in more detail in Fig. 16, we use two of the
invertible re-ordering and re-shaping operations from [29],
but nested within a single coupling block. This way, the
subnetwork can make use of a strided 3 × 3 convolution as
a learned component to the downsampling. Note that we
did not perform rigorous ablations of this introduction, and
chose it mainly for better conformity to standard ResNets.
Network layout. The overall network layout is the same
as for the standard ResNet-50, which offers a good trade-
off between performance and model complexity. The input
images are immediately downsampled twice, once using a
downsampling coupling block with a 7×7 convolution, then
with a Haar wavelet transform as in [2]. The ResNet ana-
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Figure 16: Illustration of our downsampling coupling
blocks (left), compared to the standard ResNet downsam-
pling blocks (right). The invertible downsampling opera-
tion (blue circles) reorders inputs in a checkerboard pattern
as in [29].
Layer Blocks Im. size Channels R.F.
INN ResNet INN ResNet
Input 224 3 3
Entry flow 1 112 12 64 8 6
Pool (Haar/max) 56 48 64 10 10
Conv 2 x 3 56 48 256 34 34
Conv 3 x 4 28 192 512 106 90
Conv 4 x 6 14 768 1024 314 266
Conv 5 x 3 7 3072 2048 538 426
Pool (DCT/avg.) 1 150 528 2048 ∞ ∞
Table 6: For each of the resolution levels in the INN and
ResNet-50, the number of coupling/residual blocks and spa-
tial size is given, along with the number of feature channels
and the maximum possible receptive field (R.F.).
logue is the so-called entry flow, which also uses a strided
7 × 7 convolution and a max-pooling operation. A series
of coupling blocks follow this, with downsampling blocks
distributed throughout, chosen in the same way as for the
ResNet-50, detailed in Tab. 1. The output of the INN con-
sists of 3072 two dimensional feature maps at a resolution
of 7× 7 (compared to 2048 feature maps for the ResNet).
In the ResNet, the output feature maps are passed
through a global mean pooling operation. As explained in
[28], a discrete cosine transform (DCT) presents the best
invertible alternative to this: From our 3072 feature maps,
the DCT also produces mean pooled outputs, along with 48
other outputs per feature map, that encode the remaining in-
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Figure 17: Each 7× 7 feature map is transformed to 49 or-
thogonal output features, using the DCT coefficients shown
above. Green> 0, Purple< 0, white = 0. The top left most
output feature is equal to the mean pooling operation.
formation. The DCT coefficients are visualized in Fig. 17.
As a final step, the ResNet performs a linear projection to
the 1000 logits. The analogous operation for the INN is tak-
ing the distance of the output z to each of the 1000 cluster
centers.
Low-rank µy . If each entry of µy is learned indepen-
dently, the total number of parameters for D-dimensional
latent space and M classes will be DM ≈ 150 Mil for Im-
ageNet. This is completely impractical, as µy alone would
make up the majority of network parameters, which will
only lead to overfitting. We solve this by dividing up µy into
two parts, corresponding to the mean-pooled and the higher-
order DCT variables: µy = [µmean,y, µrest,y]. We freely
learn all approx. 3 Mil parameters of µmean,y, and choose a
low-rank representation for the remaining µrest,y , using K
prototype vectors µk:
µrest,y =
K∑
k=1
αykµk (28)
Both µk and αyk are learned. This reduces the number
of parameters to DmeanM + K(Drest + M). Choosing
K = 128 empirically gives the best validation performance,
and results in approx. 19 Mil parameters, almost a factor of
10 less than the full DM . However, it is important to note
that this is still much more than the fully connected layer
10
50
100
160
Figure 18: For the 49 DCT components images shown in
Fig. 17, the mean spread of the corresponding entries of µy
across classes is shown. Intuitively, this is how much each
DCT component contributes to classification. A value of 0
means that these dimensions do not affect the classification
at all. The mean pooled component has by far the largest in-
fluence, and the contribution of the high order components
(bottom right) is negligible. Due to the random horizontal
flip augmentation, the horizontally anti-symmetric compo-
nents hardly contribute (alternating rows).
of a standard ResNet, with approx. 2 Mil parameters. This
indicates it might be possible to find an even more efficient
representation of µy without sacrificing performance. The
influence of each component of the low-rank µy is shown in
Fig. 18. While µmean,y contributes by far the most, training
without µrest,y entirely (setting it to zero), degrades the val-
idation top-1 prediction performance by several percentage
points.
Data augmentation and training. As data augmentation,
we perform the usual random crops and horizontal flips,
with two additions: Firstly, as is standard practice with nor-
malizing flows specifically, we add uniform noise with am-
plitude 1/255 to the images, to remove the quantization.
This is necessary when training with the Jacobian, as the
quantization otherwise leads to problems. Secondly, we use
label smoothing [46] with α = 0.05. This is necessary
to prevent the mixture centroids from drifting further and
further apart: training with perfectly hard labels makes the
implicit assumption that all class components are infinitely
separated.
The training scheme is the same as for the standard
ResNet [22]: we use the SGD optimizer with a momentum
of 0.9 and the weight decay set to 0.0001. We set the initial
learning rate slightly lower to 0.07 compared to 0.1 for the
original ResNet. We also perform two subsequent cooling
steps whenever the loss plateaus, decreasing the learning
rate by a factor of 10 each time. The batch size is 64 per
21
GPU, training on 6 GPUs.
B. Expected Predictive Uncertainty
For the pairwise predictive uncertainty, we only consider
two classes, y ∈ {1, 2}. We denote the distance of the class
centers as ∆µ = ‖µ1 − µ2‖. We assume y = 1 is the top
prediction. This is just for simplification, as 1 and 2 can
be swapped in the derivation if y = 2 is the top prediction.
The prediction confidence c for any latent vector z is then
between 0.5 and 1.0, computed as
c(z) =
p(z | y=1)
p(z | y=1) + p(z | y=2) (29)
If the model has converged correctly, the latent distribution
will be
p(Z) =
1
2
N (µ1; 1) + 1
2
N (µ2; 1) (30)
This allows us to explicitly work out how the confidences
will be distributed through the change-of-variables formula.
Note that z can be expressed in cylindrical coordinates ori-
ented along the line connecting µ1 and µ2. All the radial
parts integrate out, only the position along this line is rele-
vant. After some substitutions and simplifications, we ob-
tain
p(c) =
1
A
(
c− c2)−3/2 exp(− 1
2∆µ2
log2
(
1
c
− 1
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=ρ(c)
(31)
A is the normalization constant and has no closed form:
A =
∫ 1
1/2
ρ(c)dc (32)
And we simply call the unnormalized density ρ(c). Finally,
the expected confidence C can be readily computed as
C =
∫
cρ(c)dc∫
ρ(c)dc
(33)
The expected uncertainty as opposed to the confidence is
simply 1 − C. We confirm our analytic computation us-
ing a Monte Carlo simulation of the two-class case, and get
perfect agreement.
C. Additional Figures and Tables
This section provides the following additional materials:
• PCA visualizations of the latent space: Fig. 19.
• Calibration curves for all models: Fig. 20.
• More examples of adversarial trajectories for the
model with a 2D decision space: Fig. 21.
• Adversarial trajectories for the full 1000-class model:
Fig. 22.
• Tables with the precise numbers used in Fig. 13: Ta-
bles 7, 8, 9.
• Resulting images for each setting used in Fig. 13: Figs.
23 - 31.
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β = 0 β = 1 β = 16 β =∞ ResNet 101
hamster wood rabbit beaver banana cucumber lemon fire engine pickup basketball baseball
Figure 19: Layout of the learned GMM in latent space when the same architecture is trained with different values of β, with
ResNet 50 shown for reference. As the ResNet does not explicitly model a GMM we performed an LDA projection of the
2nd-last layer onto two dimensions. Class separation improves as β increases, and no separation occurs at β = 0. Similar
classes are grouped close to each other. Actual separation in the high-dimensional latent space is, of course, much better than
in this two-dimensional projection.
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Figure 20: Calibration results for models trained with different values for β and the ResNet. All our GC’s are better calibrated
then the ResNet, which starts to get quite overconfident for expected probability values above 0.4. We also observe the model
trained with β = infinity to make overconfident predictions. As this model does not learn anything about p(x) it can be
considered a DC.
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Figure 21: Additional examples for Fig. 11 with different settings for κ.
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Figure 22: Visualization of the adversarial trajectories for the full model, κ = 1. The trajectory is projected to 2D by fitting
a plane through the five classes that the trajectory passes closest to.
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OoD EntropyConfidence Corruption Success 1t-tt p(x) p(x) XCorr.β
d=0 d=66 d=1000 d=0 d=66 d=1000 d=0 d=66 d=1000 d=0 d=0 d=66 d=1000 X d=0 d=66 d=1000
p(x) Val
0 89.94 74.5 93.99 0.033 0.057 0.123 90 74 93 99.91 99.77 99.15 98.79 1.99 0 0 0 48.67
1 100 99.99 99.99 0.016 0.020 0.031 100 100 100 93.86 91.74 85.52 75.26 1.92 0 0 0 47.99
2 99.99 99.99 99.99 0.014 0.018 0.019 100 100 100 79.68 77.34 61.69 36.78 1.63 0 0 0 48.39
4 96.33 97.6 96.2 0.012 0.015 0.016 100 100 100 48.17 49.88 45.56 35.55 1.46 0.23 0.17 0.26 49.13
8 72.19 74.02 72.07 0.009 0.012 0.013 100 100 99 63.83 64.96 61.57 37.62 1.36 1.64 1.55 1.73 51.35
16 65.14 64.91 64.06 0.008 0.010 0.010 100 99 100 70.78 72.69 70.23 50.40 1.30 2.04 2.07 2.22 51.82
32 59.34 64.15 56.3 0.008 0.010 0.009 100 98 98 76.24 77.60 76.98 64.94 1.28 2.39 2.07 2.58 53.23
infinity 60.86 61.07 61.52 0.007 0.010 0.009 100 98 98 56.41 56.33 56.44 53.48 1.09 2.23 2.17 2.20 52.12
RN 66.66 - - 0.008 - - 100 - - - 1.02 1.84 - - -
Table 7: κ = 0.01
OoD EntropyConfidence Corruption Success 1t-tt p(x) p(x) XCorr.β
d=0 d=66 d=1000 d=0 d=66 d=1000 d=0 d=66 d=1000 d=0 d=0 d=66 d=1000 X d=0 d=66 d=1000
p(x) Val
0 91.50 77.5 94.5 0.032 0.056 0.122 91 77 94 99.50 99.38 99.35 98.89 1.99 0 0 0 48.67
1 100 100 99.99 0.015 0.020 0.031 100 100 100 94.26 92.25 85.28 75.53 1.92 0 0 0 47.99
2 99.99 99.99 99.99 0.014 0.018 0.019 100 100 100 80.22 77.60 60.43 36.07 1.63 0 0 0 48.39
4 98.0 98.76 97.86 0.011 0.015 0.015 100 100 100 48.98 48.85 42.89 34.87 1.46 0.11 0.09 0.15 49.13
8 80.15 86.47 80.81 0.009 0.012 0.012 100 100 100 63.98 65.25 62.47 40.70 1.36 1.26 0.86 1.26 51.35
16 77.24 77.99 79.98 0.009 0.010 0.010 100 100 100 70.99 72.75 70.35 52.84 1.30 1.46 1.37 1.30 51.82
32 73.09 78.41 76.35 0.008 0.010 0.009 100 100 100 77.79 78.90 80.13 66.38 1.28 1.68 1.34 1.54 53.23
infinity 76.91 77.72 79.56 0.007 0.009 0.009 100 100 100 59.09 59.12 59.82 56.50 1.09 1.44 1.38 1.28 52.12
RN 83.8 - - 0.08 - - 100 - - - 1.00 1.15 - - -
Table 8: κ = 1
OoD EntropyConfidence Corruption Success 1t-tt p(x) p(x) XCorr.β
d=0 d=66 d=1000 d=0 d=66 d=1000 d=0 d=66 d=1000 d=0 d=0 d=66 d=1000 X d=0 d=66 d=1000
p(x) Val
0 100 100 100 0.231 0.237 0.237 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.99 0 0 0 48.67
1 100 100 100 0.180 0.188 0.190 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.98 1.92 0 0 0 47.99
2 100 100 100 0.181 0.167 0.165 100 100 100 100 100 100 97.41 1.63 0 0 0 48.39
4 100 100 100 0.158 0.172 0.164 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.98 1.46 0 0 0 49.13
8 100 100 100 0.109 0.135 0.135 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1.36 0 0 0 51.35
16 100 100 100 0.080 0.103 0.102 100 100 100 73.05 72.72 62.59 60.17 1.30 0 0 0 51.82
32 100 100 100 0.061 0.079 0.077 100 100 100 99.97 100 100 100 1.28 0 0 0 53.23
infinity 100 100 100 0.052 0.073 0.073 100 100 100 99.98 99.98 99.97 99.97 1.09 0 0 0 52.12
RN 100 - - 0.056 - - 100 - - - 1.04 0 - - -
Table 9: κ =∞
Table 10: Table 7,8 and 9 show the quantitative results of our adversarial attack experiments. Each table was obtained
by performing the attack with a different value for κ ∈ 0.01, 1, inf . A high value for κ aims a more certain posterior for
targeted classes. The cell background colors green, orange and red stand for different values for d to ease the comparison
across models and tables for a human reader. The variable d quantifies the strength on fooling the intrinsic attack detection
mechanism of our learned classifiers. Note, that the ResNet does not model the data likelihood and therefore has not this
capability. We report the maximum class probability (Confidence), the pixel-wise l2-distance between the original and the
adversarially perturbed image averaged over all pixels (Corruption), the success rate of the attack (Success), the one (1t-tt)
and two-tailed (p(x)) typicality test OoD detection scores, as well as the posterior predictive uncertainty for the original (X)
and the corrupted validation data xcorr.. Furthermore, we report the likelihood of the original validation data (p(X) Val).
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β = 16 β =∞ ResNet
Figure 23: κ = 0.01, d = 0
Original β = 1 β = 4
β = 16 β =∞
Figure 24: κ = 0.01, d = 66
Original β = 1 β = 4
β = 16 β =∞
Figure 25: κ = 0.01, d = 1000
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Figure 26: κ = 1, d = 0
Original β = 1 β = 4
β = 16 β =∞
Figure 27: κ = 1, d = 66
Original β = 1 β = 4
β = 16 β =∞
Figure 28: κ = 1, d = 1000
27
Original β = 1 β = 4
β = 16 β =∞ ResNet
Figure 29: κ =∞, d = 0
.jpg Original β = 1 β = 4
β = 16 β =∞
Figure 30: κ =∞, d = 66
Original β = 1 β = 4
β = 16 β =∞
Figure 31: κ =∞, d = 1000
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